



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

which it was rumored the Emperor intended to organize into a noble body-guard after the fashion of the *ancien régime*. This gave Norvins an opportunity of seeing service with the Grande Armée and he describes, not indeed with the soldier-like enthusiasm of Marbot, but with the somewhat indifferent interest of an amateur, the campaign of Friedland in 1807. Since his brief taste of military life did not promise swifter promotion than his experience as a civilian, Norvins refused a commission in the army and entered the service of Napoleon's youngest brother Jerome, the king of Westphalia. The personalities of the little German court are brilliantly depicted, but the theatre was too small for the ambition of Norvins and he speedily abandoned Jerome in the hope of at last receiving a satisfactory place from Napoleon. In 1810, he was appointed director-general of the police of Rome, but the chapters of the *Mémorial* dealing with his sojourn there are, with the exception of a few pages dealing with Fouché's brief appearance in 1814, unfortunately lost. The *Mémorial* then terminates to all intents and purposes with the appointment of Norvins to his Roman post.

What, it may be asked, is the historical value of these reminiscences of M. de Norvins? It will be seen that he had plenty of opportunities of studying great men and witnessing great events. But he observed them not with the eye of a statesman or of a political philosopher; he throws no new light that can be relied on upon the actual framing of policy or the responsibility for measures; he was never enough on the inside to learn how the mainspring worked. But from the point of view of a well-bred man of the best society and of a keen observer of men and women, he has left a picture of unrivalled vivacity and brightness of many phases of bygone life. Norvins knew his world, the world of society, perfectly; no one was ever better fitted than he to judge of social politics, and it is as a kindly and witty gentleman that he writes of the experiences of his life. He does not give us indeed the life of the Grande Armée as Marbot has imperishably described it; but he gives us a different point of view of the same period, just as characteristically and typically French. A word of praise should be said for the excellent editing and admirable notes of M. de Lanzac de Laborie, which greatly enhance the value of the most delightful book of memoirs which has appeared in France since the publication of the memoirs of the Baron de Marbot.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

*Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne* (1808), d'après sa Correspondance inédite et des Documents originaux. Par le Comte MURAT. (Paris: F. Plon, Nourrit et Cie. 1897. Pp. xi, 478.)

THIS volume is incontestably the most valuable contribution to the history of the First Empire which has been published during the last twelve months. Its value is due, not only to the careful analysis of docu-

ments and to the novelty of its point of view, but also to the sound historical method pursued by the writer. The very name of the author naturally gives rise to a suspicion of partiality ; he frankly devotes himself to the task of clearing the reputation of his great-uncle ; but he approaches his task with candor and modesty, gives a full account of his authorities and of the way in which the material he uses came into his hand, and makes his case effective not by rhetorical passages but by carefully illustrating his points with citations from the letters of Napoleon and of Murat. It is owing to the evidence he gives of knowledge and judgment, that impartial readers are likely to judge his pleading favorably, and if he can deal as effectively and moderately with the other test period of Murat's life as he has dealt with his hero's career in Spain, he will succeed in modifying the hitherto accepted verdict of history.

In a brief preface, the Comte Murat describes how it fell to his lot to write the volume which has just been published. No career is more striking in that epoch of striking careers which marks the transition of Europe from the old to the new under the leadership of France, than that of Joachim Murat. Europe was almost as startled to see the humble inn-keeper's son of southern France raised to a throne, as it was to see the elevation of a Corsican officer of artillery to a power unknown since the days of Charles the Great. There are several Murats as there are several Napoleons. Just as some modern students can see in Napoleon nothing but the great general and man of war, disregarding his extraordinary faculty for administration and the far-reaching sweep of his marvellous abilities, so there are many to whom Murat is but the brilliant cavalry leader. Murat as a statesman, Murat as an able and beneficent ruler, has never had justice done to him. The picture that rises actually to the mind at the mention of Murat's name is that of the *beau sabreur*, not that of the trusted lieutenant of the Emperor or that of the successful king of Naples. Of all Napoleon's brilliant *cortège*, Murat is the most famous and the least understood. That this should be so is easily explicable. The tragedy of his death at Pizzo in 1815 could not blot out the memory of his behavior in 1814 when he deserted the cause of the brother-in-law who had made him what he was, and appeared in arms against France in the moment of Napoleon's extremity. Hearty admirers of the great emperor, including the vast majority of his biographers, remembering Murat's desertion of their idol at the last, have colored their whole appreciation of his character and his career, by their knowledge of his final treachery. They admit him to have been a splendid cavalry leader, but regard him as bearing always in his heart the black sin of his final ingratitude.

But there were some few who knew Murat intimately and refused to bow to the verdict of history, which during many years of Napoleon-worship declared Murat incapable as well as treacherous. Foremost among the friends of Murat was a man who had sat on the benches of the village school with the little Joachim, and whom Murat, when he had become Joachim I., King of Naples, summoned to his side as one of his

ministers. This man, whose name was Agar, and who was later created Comte de Mosbourg, long survived his former friend, and intended from his own knowledge of Murat, with the assistance of the papers confided to him by Murat's widow, to write a defense of the king of Naples and especially an explanation of his action during those periods of his life which had been most severely criticised. The Comte de Mosbourg died in 1844 leaving his work unaccomplished, and bequeathed the notes he had made and the papers in his possession, including much of Murat's correspondence, to his son. The second Comte de Mosbourg, a distinguished French diplomatist, was also unable to find the leisure to carry out his father's ideas and it was at his death that the duty of defending Murat's memory fell to his great-nephew, the Comte Murat. The Comte de Mosbourg selected as the two most criticised episodes in Murat's career, his command in Spain in 1808 and his conduct in Italy in 1814. It is with the first of these episodes that the volume just published deals and it is to be hoped that in no long time the even more obscure period of Murat's desertion of his master may be examined in the same lucid manner. Before entering upon his task, the Comte Murat devotes between eighty and ninety pages to a brief sketch of Murat's career up to the time of his appointment to the command of the French troops in Spain. This sketch is not a full biography, but it contains many interesting letters illustrating Murat's early life and throwing light upon his character. His strong affection for his relatives, and particularly for his peasant mother, which is one of the most attractive features in his character, is neatly brought out without sickly exaggeration; his intense affection for his wife, the ambitious Caroline Bonaparte, is also artistically insisted upon; the sentimental side of the famous trooper's disposition, which Napoleon so well understood, is noted; and it comes as a little of a shock to those who might imagine the cavalry leader of Napoleon as a man of blood, to read his declaration to the Comte de Mosbourg, that he had never to his knowledge slain a man in battle. Especially important in this brief sketch is the proof given in the Comte de Mosbourg's own words, with a careful statement of the facts, that Murat was not an accomplice in the murder of the Duc d'Enghien (pp. 437-445).

But it is time to turn to the volume itself. Napoleon at St. Helena spoke of the war in the Peninsula as "that unfortunate war, the first cause of the misfortunes of France," and all historians have echoed the words of the Emperor. Worshipers of Napoleon, admirers of his genius, contemporaries who could not bear to attribute to the great man himself and to his policy the cause of his misfortunes, have ever sought to find other shoulders on which to place the blame of the Peninsular war. The fatal steps which led to it were so indubitably taken by Napoleon himself, that apologists for the Emperor have to admit his responsibility and the endeavor has therefore been made to show that it was not the Emperor's policy but the manner in which it was carried out that sowed the seeds of future disasters. And since it was Murat, the future traitor, who represented Napoleon in Spain during the critical months in 1808,

when the Spanish policy of Napoleon was worked out and the first symptoms appeared of national insurrection, Murat has had to bear the blame. It has been asserted that it was the intemperate conduct of the Emperor's lieutenant that outraged the Spanish people in his conduct towards King Charles IV., King Ferdinand VII. and Godoy, the Prince of the Peace ; that he acted from motives of personal ambition in the hope of receiving for himself the throne of Spain ; that he raised the flame of a national outbreak by his cruel suppression of the riot of May 2 in Madrid ; that he misinterpreted, if he did not directly disobey the Emperor's orders ; and that from the moment of his arrival in the country till he was smitten down by an illness caused by disappointed ambition, he failed to understand the temperament of the Spanish people and laid the ground for that bitter resentment towards France which led to the disasters of the Peninsular war. Most clearly has the Comte Murat proved the injustice of these accusations. Examining the doings of Murat in Spain, week by week and nearly day by day and hour by hour, he has proved that, in all he did, Murat was directly guided by Napoleon's instructions ; he has shown by full quotations from the Emperor's letters to his brother-in-law and from Murat's replies, how faithfully the orders of the former were carried out ; and that instead of causing trouble by making an intemperate use of his position as commander of the French troops, he did not go as far as the Emperor expected or desired in the repression of Spanish opposition to France. It was the Emperor who adopted an aggressive, and Murat a conciliatory, attitude towards the Spanish people ; it was the Emperor who dictated every step taken towards the bringing of the Spanish royal family to Bayonne ; it was the Emperor who misunderstood the probable effect of his proceedings upon the spirit of a proud and haughty race ; and it was Murat who, though left in the dark with regard to Napoleon's intentions, managed through many critical weeks to maintain the peace in Spain. The commonly held view of Murat's behavior has been largely based by historians upon a dispatch supposed to have been sent to him by the Emperor, dated March 29, 1808. This letter was first printed in Las Cases's *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* and has been accepted as authentic ever since. The editors of the great collection of Napoleon's *Correspondance* admitted that they could find no trace of the letter but assumed its authenticity and printed it in a foot-note. M. Thiers seeing the difficulty propounded a theory that the letter was written but never sent. Other writers, both contemporary and modern, have accepted the letter as genuine and founded upon it their conclusions that Murat did not faithfully carry out the Emperor's orders. Savary, Duc de Rovigo, and other contemporaries, who could not forgive Murat for his desertion of Napoleon's cause in 1814, caused their recollections of the time to fit in with Napoleon's supposed letter, thus building up a fabric of contemporary evidence which has deceived later historians. Now the Comte Murat has proved this letter to be spurious. It would take too long here to repeat his arguments, but they are conclusive. He does not pretend to explain how Las Cases came to print this supposed

despatch, but that is of minor importance, for it must be remembered that Las Cases, like all the faithful adherents of the fallen Emperor, hated Murat as a traitor and that this frame of mind made him ready to accept any proof that might clear the Emperor of the charge of want of foresight. Excluding this famous letter from consideration, it clearly appears that Murat faithfully carried out the Emperor's orders, and indeed, that he understood the condition of things in Spain better than his master. It may be said that he hoped the throne of Spain might be his reward for faithful service, but that expectation, even if he had it, which in the light of his letters seems improbable, did not make him the less zealous to prepare as far as was in his power for the peaceful accession of Joseph Bonaparte.

Las Cases reports that Napoleon in speaking at St. Helena on the Spanish war said on one occasion: "Murat bungled all this business for me." The merit of the Comte Murat's book is that he has proved, to quote his own words, that it was not Murat that bungled, and in proving this he has made a contribution of real value to our knowledge of a most important period in the history of the First Empire.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

*The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Annual Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology.* By J. W. POWELL, Director. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1897. Pp. cxxi, 336; cxix, 326.)

THESE two large volumes are presented with the fulness of illustration and excellent type of manufacture which characterized heretofore the series. Each begins with a general account of the work by the Director, which is followed by the reports of members of the Bureau.

In the Fifteenth Report the leading article is one by Professor William H. Holmes on the Stone Implements of the Potomac and Chesapeake Tide-water Regions. It is, as we should naturally expect from his pen, a thorough piece of work. It reviews the manufacture of flint stone implements from the most noteworthy sites in that region, especially those on what is known as Piny Branch, which is in the District of Columbia and which has for years engaged the attention of antiquaries. The three classes into which he divides the subject are flaked, battered and abraded stone implements, and those formed by incising or cutting. It is familiar to archaeologists that the ruder implements from this region have, by various writers, been attributed to some ancient population long preceding the Indians encountered there by the first settlers, and going back, indeed, to palaeolithic man. There is to-day in Washington a collection from this province so labeled. This opinion does not find any support in Professor Holmes's elaborate article. Whether we regard the geological materials, the conditions of the arts, or the position of the sites themselves where the rudest stone implements have been found, they all in his opinion indicate the period and the workmanship of the Indian such as we know him by history. None of them exhibits any feature